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Introduction
Since 1995, genetically modified organisms (GMO’s) have been introduced
commercially into US agriculture.  These innovations are developed and
commercialized by a handful of vertically coordinated “life science” firms who have
fundamentally altered the structure of the seed industry.  Enforcement of intellectual
property rights (IPR’s) for biological innovations has been the major incentive for a
concentration tendency in the upstream sector.  On the one hand, this monopolization
may increase long-run social welfare through an increased rate of investment in R&D
(Schumpeter).  On the other hand, due to their monopoly power, these firms are
capable of charging a ‘monopoly price’, extracting a part of the total social welfare
through ‘monopoly rents’ (Moschini and Lapan).  A popular argument used by the
opponents of agricultural biotechnology is the idea of an input industry extracting all
benefits generated by these innovations.  Are life science firms able to appropriate all
benefits or is there a limit to their monopoly power?
In the US, the first published ex-post welfare studies reveal that both farmers and gene
developers, depending on the commodity, can receive the lion share of the benefits,
(Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky).  However,
up to now no parallel ex-ante study has been published for the European Union (EU).
Hence, the EUWAB-project (European Union Welfare effects of Agricultural
Biotechnology) aims at calculating the total benefits of agricultural biotechnology
innovations in the EU and their distribution among member countries, producers,
consumers, input suppliers and government.  The project tries to answer these
questions by means of three carefully selected case studies: (1) herbicide tolerant
(HT) sugarbeets, (2) insect resistant (IR) corn and (3) HT oilseed rape.2
In this paper, we show that the EU’s sugar market can serve as a relevant case study
for the calculation of the ex-ante welfare effects of agricultural biotechnology in the
EU.  We develop a theoretical partial equilibrium welfare framework, which
explicitly recognizes that research protected by intellectual property rights generates
monopoly profits.  The result is a simulation model, which is shaped to the
characteristics of the EU’s Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar.  This
model enables, in future work
1, to assess the size and distribution of the benefits of
transgenic sugarbeet adoption in the European Union and the Rest of the World.
Arguments Advancing the European Union’s Sugar Market as a Case Study
Until now, the few published studies calculating the welfare effects of agricultural
biotechnology are applied on typical US export crops like cotton (Falck-Zepeda,
Traxler, and Nelson) and soybeans (Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky).  The major
difference with the EU is the fact that these American studies regard an ex-post
setting, while the recent moratoriums on GMO’s in the EU and the absence of
empirical farm level impact data oblige us to use ex-ante assumptions about yield
increases, cost reductions and technology fees.  However, this limitation makes it
particularly interesting, because studying the potential welfare effects associated with
agricultural biotechnology in the EU reveals the benefits foregone or costs of a
complete ban of GMO’s in the EU.
To illustrate these potential benefits, a representative case study has to be selected.
Since the technology is embedded in the seed, an agricultural commodity has to be
chosen, which is representative and important for the EU, in terms of production and
export, and preferably for the majority of EU member countries.  Moreover, the3
innovation has to be commercialized in other countries or be near commercialization
in order to obtain preliminary information about its potential impact via field trial
data.  Further, a minimal acceptance for the technology is a requisite, so that adoption
in the intermediate run is a realistic scenario for the EU.  The case of genetically
engineered animal growth hormones, such as rBST (recombinant bovine
Somatotropin) in the dairy sector, fulfils these criteria, but is unlikely to be accepted
by the European society in the coming years.  The case of transgenic sugarbeets is in
line with our criteria, providing a perfect example of agricultural biotechnology in an
important European commodity market, parallel with the existing US impact studies
mentioned above.  At present, cane sugar accounts for 70 % of global sugar
production, with beet sugar accounting for 30 % of global output (Duff).  The EU is
the world’s largest beet sugar producer and third largest sugar exporter (Koo and
Taylor).  Since transgenic sugarbeets are not yet adopted on a commercial scale
neither in the EU, nor in other parts of the world, no ex-post studies are available.
However up to now, no ex-ante study has been published yet about the potential
welfare effects of agricultural biotechnology in the sugar sector.
Sugar is one of the most heavily traded and highly protected agricultural commodities
with a world-wide average Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) of 48 % (International
Policy Council).  However, because of the residual nature of world sugar markets,
recorded prices bear little relationship to production costs.  For long periods of time,
the world sugar price cycle has been characterized by depressed prices at which not
even the world’s most efficient producers would survive.  Hence, current PSE
calculations are likely to overstate levels of support in the sugar sector, while
revealing little about the distorted nature of world markets (Harris and Tangermann).4
There is general agreement that EU sugar policies depress the world sugar market
price (Roningen and Dixit).  The EU’s Common Market Organization (CMO) for
sugar came into full effect in 1968 and has not been substantially altered since that
time.  The principal mechanism by which producers have been supported is a
common internal support price.  The quotas were introduced on a temporary basis, to
be removed after seven years.  They have been maintained ever since, however,
subject to periodic review (Harris and Tangermann).  An important implication for
our study is that these market interventions distort the flow of benefits from R&D in
agriculture, such as biotechnology research (Alston, Norton, and Pardey).  With the
recent WTO agreements, trade barriers and other market interventions are being
reduced gradually.  In the case of the sugar sector, the WTO agreement establishes
limits on subsidized exports.  The EU has agreed to reduce production quotas to meet
its subsidized exports obligations (Poonyth et al.).  Previous studies (Sudaryanto,
Wong, Sturgiss, and Borrell, Roningen and Dixit, Schmitz and Vercammen, Leuck
and Neff, Roberts and Wish Wilson, Devadoss and Kropf, Borrell and Pearce)
evaluated the implications of trade liberalization on the world sugar market.  The
latter would have a small effect on the volume of EU production, since the European
beet industry as a whole has shown to be relatively competitive (Haley, Kennedy and
Harrison).  The sugar industry is facing a slow but steady progress towards greater
liberalization of global trade.  Over the last 40 years, real world sugar prices have
fallen, on average, by between 1.5 % and 2.0 % per year (Duff).  Even in the case of
the highly protected European beet industry, growers are paid a fixed ‘green rate’
price, i.e. not corrected for inflation.  This means that they have to compete
continuously against this real price decline of 1.88 % per year via technological
progress
2.  These arguments provide a powerful economic rationale for enhancing5
competitiveness by exploiting any cost savings that can be achieved trough the use of
genetically modified (GM) crops.  GM sugar beet is already approved to be grown in
the USA, and will shortly be grown in China.  It cannot be long before South Africa
and Australia follow suite.  Clearly, it is wise for the EU to take a careful, rational,
science-based look at all the economic, agricultural and environmental issues
involved (Dewar, May, and Pidgeon).  This advances the elaboration of an ex-ante
study about the potential welfare effects of agricultural biotechnology in the sugar
sector of the European Union.
In the food processing and retail sectors, attitudes to GM crops are coloured by
consumer opinion.  For this reason, European sugar producers have for the most part
adopted a position of neutrality towards GM beet.  However, it is possible that new
labeling laws in the EU may encourage sugar processors to express greater interest in
GM beet.  Under these laws, all foods containing GM crops or their derivatives are
required to be labeled, except when neither protein nor DNA resulting from the
genetic modification is present.  For the EU sugar industry, this suggests that if GM
beet were to be approved for use in the EU at some point in the future, the sugar
produced from such beets would not have to be labeled as a GM food (Duff).  The
extraction and purification processes used in sugar production should ensure the
purity of the final product.  However, the pulp by-product is not pure and can contain
traces of modified genes.  Since Europe and Japan are reluctant to accept GM pulp
3,
up to now, the marketing concerns of US sugar processors have been a significant
roadblock to the introduction of GM sugar beets in the US (Lilleboe).6
Transgenic Sugarbeets
Effective weed control is essential for economic sugarbeet production in all growing
areas of the world (Loock et al.).  This was recognized as soon as the crop was first
grown (Achard).  Yield losses can be up to 100 %, such is the poor ability of beet to
compete with the large range of weeds present in arable soils (Dewar, May, and
Pidgeon).  A survey on changes in weed control techniques in Europe between 1980
and 1998 revealed that (1) the number of possibilities to control weeds has increased,
while (2) the frequency of sprayings increased, (3) the quantity of herbicides per
hectare decreased, and (4) weed control techniques shifted gradually from pre-
emergence towards post-emergence application, combined with reduced tillage
practices (Schäufele).  The post-emergence herbicides glyphosate and glufosinate-
ammonium provide a broader spectrum of weed control in sugarbeet than current
weed control systems, while at the same time reducing the number of active
ingredients used in the beet crop.  As a result, glyphosate and glufosinate-ammonium
have better environmental and toxicological profiles than most of the herbicides they
replace (May).
Glyphosate was first introduced as an herbicide in 1971.  New genetic modification
technology has allowed the production of sugarbeets tolerant to these herbicides.  The
gene that confers tolerance to glyphosate was discovered in a naturally occurring soil
bacterium.  This bacterium produces an enzyme, which prevents glyphosate from
attacking another enzyme called EPSPS that controls the production of essential
amino acids in the plant, and without which the plant would die.  The gene was
isolated using microbiological techniques, and introduced into the beet genome using
the gene transfer technology.  Glufosinate-ammonium was discovered in 1981.  The7
gene that confers tolerance to glufosinate was also discovered from a naturally
occurring soil bacterium and introduced into the beet’s genome, accompanied by an
antibiotic ‘marker’ gene that confers resistance to kanamycin to allow selection of
transformed cells in tissue culture (Dewar, May, and Pidgeon).  Two commercial
herbicide tolerant (HT) sugarbeet varieties resulted from these genetic insertion
techniques: (1) a Roundup Ready ™ (RR) variety, tolerant to glyphosate and
developed by Monsanto, and (2) a Liberty Link ™ (LL) variety, tolerant to
glufosinate-ammonium and developed by Aventis.  These kits composed of a
transgenic variety combined with a post-emergence herbicide, offer farmers a number
of potential benefits in weed management.  Apart from broad-spectrum weed control,
it offers flexibility in the timing of applications, compared to the existing programs,
and will reduce the need for complex compositions of spray solutions.  For most
growers, herbicide tolerant sugarbeets are likely to result in cheaper weed control than
current systems (May).
Moreover, these innovations are entirely coherent within the ongoing trend towards
post-emergence weed control and reduced tillage techniques and the sharpening of the
legal constraints for the application of herbicides, especially concerning the protection
of the user and the environment (Schäufele).  Both herbicides have a low toxicity and
are metabolized fast and without residues in the soil.  As a result, the introduction of
herbicide tolerant sugarbeet varieties could be an approach to sustainable sugarbeet
cultivation (Märländer and Bückmann).8
Previous Studies Examining the Returns to R&D in the European Sugar Sector
Up to date, only two studies have been published estimating the returns to R&D in
European sugar production (Thirtle, Zimmermann and Zeddies).  Thirtle uses an R&D
production function approach for the Eastern counties of England to explain total
factor productivity (TFP) growth in sugar production.  He finds a significant influence
of R&D on TFP, lagged six and nine years after the research expenditure.  The overall
rate of return (ROR) to publicly funded agricultural research amounts to 11 %.
However, since R&D in agriculture is progressively managed by the private sector,
e.g. with the advent of biotechnology, increased private extension and marketing
expenditures could reduce the adoption lag of innovations and significantly increase
their internal rate of return (IRR) to producers.  According to Zimmermann and
Zeddies, 58 % of the global productivity progress in the Bavarian region of Germany
is attributed to sugar beet seed.  Moreover, 80 % of the increase in beet yield can be
attributed to seed improvements and approximately 20 % to other production factors,
especially plant protection and machinery (Märländer).  These figures suggest that
progress in sugar beet breeding can generate remarkable economic benefits, especially
biotechnology that marries seed with plant protection improvements.
Measuring Surplus Generated by IPR-Protected Innovations
Conventionally, research benefits were estimated assuming that the research is
publicly funded and innovated inputs competitively sold in the input market.  Figure 1
represents the output (a) and input (b) markets surrounding the farm sector.  Let S0(p)
be the upward sloping supply curve and D(p) the downward sloping demand curve in
the output market for the conventional agricultural commodity being modeled (Figure
1a).  The innovation is assumed to be cost reducing, resulting in a shift of the supply9
curve from S0(p) to Sc(p) on the condition that the innovated input is competitively
supplied.  This supply shift leads to an increase in economic welfare, equal to the area
ABDE, the so-called gross annual research benefits (GARB).  The model presented in
Figure 1a, has been used for numerous agricultural research evaluation and research
priority studies (Alston, Norton, and Pardey).
However, most of the recent agricultural biotechnology innovations have been
developed by private firms protected by intellectual property rights (IPR’s), such as
patents, which confer monopoly rights to the discoverer (with some limitations).  This
is a new phenomenon in the agribusiness sector.  The result is that prices for these
inputs are higher than they would be in a perfectly competitive market.  Therefore,
Moschini and Lapan bring along some new elements in the conventional analytical
framework.  They complete it by including the possibility that the innovation is
protected by IPR’s in the input market.  Thus, the correct evaluation of the benefits
from R&D aimed at agriculture needs to account for the relevant institutional and
industry structures responsible for the actual development of technological
innovations.
The technology is assumed to be cost reducing and this can be visualized in the input
market (Figure 1b) by representing input prices in efficiency units, resulting from a
one-factor-augmentation model (Moschini and Lapan).  This allows the new, more
productive, factor to be measured in the same physical units as the pre-innovation
input.  Farmers will adopt the new variety if the price in efficiency units of the new
input is less than that of the old input: w1/a £ c.  In other words, farmers will adopt a
biotechnology variety when the value of the cost reduction plus the increase in yield is10
greater than the price differential between these varieties.  It is reasonable to assume
that both types of seeds are produced at a constant marginal cost c.  We also assume
that the conventional technology is produced in a perfectly competitive input market,
so that its price approximates this marginal cost c.  However, in the case of the new
technology, the IPR’s allow the firm to hold a temporary monopoly position, bounded
of course by some limit pointed out by Lapan and Moschini.  Let X(w) be the
downward sloping demand curve of the farm sector for genetically engineered seed in
the input market (Figure 1b).  The higher the price w, the lower demand x will be for
the improved variety due to the existence of alternative conventional technologies
such as chemicals.  If the firm is the only player in the market, it faces the demand
curve X(w).  The marginal return curve MR, or return of an additional unit seed sold
on the market, can be easily derived from this demand curve (Figure 1b).  The firm
will maximize profits by producing an amount GM seed equal to ax1, where marginal
cost c/a in efficiency units is equal to marginal return MR.  Since it is the only player
in the market facing demand curve X(w), the firm is able to raise its price above the
marginal cost c/a .  Even at a price w1/a , the farm sector is willing to buy ax1 units of
the GM seed variety.  This monopoly price w1/a will maximize firm profits and will
allow the firm to regain the high R&D costs via a so-called monopoly rent,
represented by rectangle w1/aHIc/a.  Because of the fact that the monopolistic seed
price w1/a is higher than the marginal cost c/a, i.e. the seed price that would emerge
in a perfectly competitive market, farm-level benefits are lower and the corresponding
supply shift is smaller.  The effects of a departure from the assumption of perfect
competition towards monopoly are visualized in Figure 1 by a shift of the supply
curve from Sc(p) to Sm(p).  Hence, the Marshallian surplus increase equals area ABCF
instead of simply area ABDE as in the conventional framework of Alston, Norton, and11
Pardey.  However, according to Moschini and Lapan, welfare effects of IPR-protected
innovated inputs have to be estimated in the input market, with area cGHw1/a
representing the change in Marshallian surplus.  Thus, the correct estimation of total
welfare increase is equal to the sum of the shaded areas cGHw1/a and w1/aHIc/a.
However, equivalent with what Alston, Sexton, and Zhang pointed out in their study
about imperfect competition in the downstream processing sector, extreme
assumptions of monopoly or monopsony seem at least as inappropriate as one of
perfect competition.  Indeed, different patents exist for the same phenotypic trait, e.g.
RR® (Monsanto) and LL® (Aventis) for herbicide resistance.  Thus, the ML-model,
which focuses on the extreme setting of pure monopoly, might need to be adapted to
account for a departure from monopoly to different oligopolistic settings.  This can be
visually done in Figure 1b by rotating the marginal return (MR) curve towards the
demand curve X(w) in the input market (Fulton and Keyowski).  If the MR curve in
Figure 1b corresponds to the extreme position of monopoly in the input market, in the
case of pure competition this curve would coincide with the X(w) curve.  An
oligopolistic input market would then be an intermediary situation between these two
extremes, with a marginal return curve situated somewhere between MR and X(w).  In
Figure 1a, a departure from a monopolistic towards an oligopolistic input market can
be visualized by shifting the supply curve from Sm(p) to somewhere between Sm(p)
and Sc(p).12
The Model
Equivalently to what Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson pointed out in their study
about the welfare effects of Bt cotton in the US, econometric implementation of
Marshallian welfare estimations in the input market (Figure 1b) would require data
that are difficult to obtain, particularly for recent innovations and especially for our
ex-ante evaluation.  Therefore, in a more recent paper Moschini, Lapan, and
Sobolevsky adapt their methodology to a model that is closer to the actual working of
the herbicide tolerance innovation and apply it to the case of RR® soybeans.  They
develop an aggregate supply function incorporating four technology-specific
parameters enabling to parameterize the herbicide resistance innovation in detail:
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General Parameters: Technology-Specific Parameters:
l = scale parameter;
A, G = parameters subsuming all other
input prices, presumed constant;
h = elasticity of yield with respect to
sugarbeet price;
d = constant optimal density of seeds;
w = price of seed;
q = elasticity of land supply with respect
to sugarbeet profit per hectare.
a = coefficient of unit profit increase due
to the HT technology;
b = coefficient of yield change due to the
HT technology;
r ˛ [0,1] = adoption rate;
m = markup on HT seed price (reflecting
technology fee).
average profit per hectare p




In an analogous way, we parameterize the introduction of HT sugarbeets for each
separate country i in the EU and calculate the aggregate EU sugar
4 supply function by
adding up all
5 country-specific supply functions:
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This aggregate sugar supply function is very detailed in that it contains 11 parameters
per country, totaling 154 parameters, of which 56 are technology-specific.
Next, we model the innovation as occurring in a large, open economy with technology
spillovers and shape the two-region framework of Alston, Norton, and Pardey (p. 219)
to the specific features of the European Union’s Common Market Organization
(CMO) for sugar (Figure 3).  The basic Regulation for the organization is Regulation
(EEC) No 1785/81 (European Commission).  Regulation (EC) No 1101/95 extends
the production arrangements to the marketing year 2000-2001.  The marketing year
runs from 1 July to 30 June.  Each year, the Council fixes intervention
6 (pi) and target
prices (about 5 % higher) for sugar and prices for beet.  Intervention is opened for
limited quantities under a quota for which the price guarantee is almost full (A quota)
and a quota for which the price guarantee is partial (B quota).  The basic beet price is
fixed annually in the light of the intervention price for white sugar and standard
amounts representing the processing margin, the yield, the receipts of refineries from
sales of molasses and, where appropriate, the cost incurred in delivering beet to
refineries.  The minimum price is fixed each year for beet processed into sugar and is
the minimum price that sugar manufacturers are obliged to pay to producers for the
purchase of beet.  Since the EU production quotas are based on historic national
production levels, their relationship varies widely between European member
countries.  Anticipating an increase in consumption, the quotas are set at a higher14
level than internal consumption C, the internal demand (D) at the intervention price pi
(Figure 3).  This overproduction Qd (= Qa + Qb – C), although receiving a guaranteed
B sugar price pb, is exported on the world market and hence subsidized.  This export
subsidy system is completely auto-financed by levies (ta and tb) on A and B quota
production.  Consumers, who pay a high internal intervention price pi, subsidize the
internal within-quota production.  A and B quota production receive prices equal to
respectively
pa = pi (1 – ta), and  (3)
pb = pi (1 – ta – tb). (4)
A levy ta of maximum 2 % of the intervention price applies on the entire (A + B)
within-quota production.  Moreover, B quota production receives an additional, more
variable, levy tb of maximum 37.5 % of the intervention price.  Sugar manufacturers
and sugarbeet growers pay the levies in accordance with the income they obtain from
sugar, i.e. 40 % and 60 % respectively (European Commission).  Both levies serve to
satisfy the auto-financing constraint (Combette, Giraud-Heraud, and Réquillart):
pi ta(Qa + Qb) + pi tb Qb = (Qa + Qb – C)(pi – pw) (5)
They have to fill the gap between the world price pw and the high internal price pi for
within-quota production in excess of consumption that has to be exported on the
world market.  If the auto-financing constraint does not solve by combining (5) and
(6), the system (5) and (7) is solved.  Finally, when the latter neither yields a solution,
a positive multiplicator a is defined solving the system (5) and (8).





tb ˛ [0, 0.375]
ta = (1 + a) 0.02
(8)
tb = (1 + a) 0.375
This explains why B quota prices pb are more variable and sensitive to world prices.
For 1992-1993 for example, Combette, Giraud-Heraud, and Réquillart report price
transmission coefficients between 0 and 0.11 for A sugar and between 0.11 and 0.62
for B sugar.  Thus, the producer price is endogenous since it depends on sugar
production, internal demand and the gap between the intervention and the world price.
It should be noted that in some EU member states (Spain, Ireland, Italy, Greece, the
Netherlands, and the UK) processors pay a weighted-average price for beet covering
all within-quota sugar, based on pa and pb (Combette, Giraud-Heraud, and Réquillart).
In those cases, the impact of changes in minimum producer prices is masked for
farmers, though it is fully felt by processors (Harris and Tangermann).  All out of
quota production is called ‘C sugar’ and can either be (1) stocked
7 to be carried over
to the following marketing year, enabling to smooth out annual production variations,
or (2) exported on the world market at the world price, i.e. without
8 export subsidies.
Finally, the EU’s CMO for sugar contains some additional features, such as the ACP
import arrangements, conferring free access to the EU market for ACP countries, up
to a certain maximum limit.  These arrangements are essentially aid flows accruing to
ACP countries and are omitted from our welfare framework, since they do not affect
the flow of research benefits.  The same argument holds for the EU’s stocking and
carrying-over policy.  Since this policy is not likely to affect the flow of research
benefits, at least in the medium
9 and long run, it is omitted from our model.16
For each country, the 4 technology-specific parameters engender a pivotal, divergent
shift of the supply curve.  Depending on the pricing system (two-tier or mixed price),
which member states apply, the research benefits can differ substantially.  In a two-
tier price system, the marginal return (MR) curve is stepwise, following the three price
levels pa, pb, and pw (Figure 2a).  In a mixed price system, the stepwise MR curve has
only two levels: pm and pw (Figure 2b).  Country A represents a high cost producer.
SA,0 and SA,1 are respectively its pre-innovation and post-innovation marginal cost (or
supply) curves.  Country A is only able to supply high-priced A sugar, since its
marginal cost curve intersects with the MR curve at levels below Qa.  In a two-tier
price system, the research benefits, visualized by area a, are higher than in a system
with a unique quota and mixed price (area a – area d).  This can be explained by the
fact that its marginal production increase, due to the innovation, is priced lower in a
mixed price system.
The opposite holds for a lower cost producer B, which is able to supply lower-priced
B sugar.  Changing from a two-tier pricing to a mixed pricing system enables to
capture a larger part (area b + area e) of the research benefits since its extra
production is priced higher.  Finally, for a low cost producer C, producing significant
amounts of C sugar at the world price, the marginal return pw and hence the research
benefits (supply shift from SC,0 to SC,1) of its within-quota production are unaffected
by the pricing system (area c).  It is clear that in all three cases, countries extract a part
of research benefits, which are protected from price depreciations
10 due to guaranteed
EU intervention prices.17
In Figure 3, our welfare framework has been outlined.  Primes have been used to
designate the rest of the world (ROW).  At the center of the analysis is the calculation
of a counterfactual world price (after decline) to isolate the effect of the technology-
induced supply shift from other exogenous changes in supply and demand.  It is
important to note that this price change would differ from the observed change in
world price if the technology had been adopted as assumed.  It rather represents what
the world price would have been if all supply and demand conditions had been
identical except for the introduction of the new technology (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler,
and Nelson).  The world price reduction (from p0 to p2) is a synergy of two forces.
First, the EU technology-induced export expansion would cause the world price to
decline from p0 to p1.  This price decrease can be determined using a reduced form
equation, extracted from the FAPRI’s world sugar model by Poonyth et al., which
calculates the world sugar price as a function of EU sugar net exports Nt:
) log( 46 . 0 ) log( 0 . 1 ) log( 1 - + - = t t w N N p (9)
By taking the first differential, we obtain a formula in elasticity-form, relating relative
world price changes to relative changes in net exports:
[ ] [ ] [ ] ) log( 46 . 0 ) log( 0 . 1 ) log( 1 - ¶ + ¶ - = ¶ t t w N N p
1




















If we assume that imports are not affected by the innovation, due to fixed ACP import
arrangements, and since Nt = qt – Ct – Mt (imports), we can transform equation 10 into
and equation relating relative technology-induced supply (qt) increases to relative
world price changes:
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The short-run flexibility is minus one and the long-run flexibility is approximately
half that of the short-run, reflecting sugar export demand elasticities that are
approximately twice as large in the long run as in the short run (Poonyth et al.).
Secondly, the ROW technology-induced export expansion, which equals the reduction
of the demand for EU exports, would further reduce the world price from p1 to the




The positive ROW supply shift (from S’0 to S’1) translates into a negative export
demand shift (from ED’0 to ED’1):
ED’0 = D’ – S’0 (13)
ED’1 = D’ – S’1 (14)
Market clearing at equilibrium in the world market implies:
ED’1 = ES1 = S1 – C (15)
Equation 15 finally yields an estimate of the counterfactual world price p2.  The
corresponding surplus changes can now be computed using standard procedures (Just,
Hueth, and Schmitz).  If Li(pi) denotes the optimal allocation of land to sugarbeets in
country i, the variation in producer surplus (relative to the benchmark where the unit
profit is pi,0) due to the innovation (which leads to a unit profit pi,1) can be calculated
according to an elegant methodology of Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, and
adapted to the EU’s CMO for sugar.  The producer surplus change strongly depends
on the competitiveness of the country in sugar production.  The change in producer
surplus of a high-cost country i that only produces A sugar in a two-tier price system,











Parameter pa,1,i represents the unit profit for A quota sugar with price pa, corrected for
the A levy change (ta) to satisfy the auto-financing constraint (equations 3 to 8).  In a
mixed price system, the research benefits can be calculated with the same formula
after replacing pa,0,i and pa,1,i by the unit profits pm,0,i and pm,1,i, occurring in a mixed
price (pm) system.  The same formula is also valid for medium-cost countries that
produce both A and B quota sugar under a mixed price system, without exporting on
the world market.  Again, these unit profits have to be corrected to satisfy the auto-
financing constraint.  In a two-tier price system, the innovation rents of these
medium-cost countries can be calculated as follows:
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For exporting low-cost countries operating in a two-tier price system, the change in
producers’ surplus is split up in two parts: (1) a within-quota part, and (2) an out-of-
quota part, earned on the world market:
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La,i and Lb,i represent respectively the A and B sugar quota, expressed in land units
(hectares). p0 and p1 are the pre- and post-innovation unit profits related to the world
prices p0 and p2.  Similarly, in a mixed price system, these research benefits equal:
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The EU’s aggregate producer surplus change is simply the sum of all production
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In Figure 3a, this aggregate benefit can be assessed by a pivotal shift of the aggregate
EU supply function (from S0 to S1).  Qd (= Qa + Qb – C) represents the within-quota
production in excess of domestic consumption C, which is exported on the world
market.  This exported production is subsidized, since it receives the guaranteed B
quota price pb, while it is exported at the world price pw.  Decline of the world price
from p0 to p2, due to the technology-induced shift of EU aggregate supply, raises
subsidy costs up to Qd (p0 – p2).  These extra costs have to be borne by the producers
via increased levies on their within-quota production (equations 3 to 8).  In most
cases, adapting only the B quota levy tb is sufficient, visualized in Figure 3a, where
these costs are represented in two ways (two areas ‘a’).  Thus, the total within-quota
benefits equal the difference between areas b and a.  To these rents, out-of-quota
benefits have to be added, represented by the difference between areas d and c.  The
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Finally, the profit of the input suppliers is simply computed as:
j j j
ROW EU j





where Lj is the total amount of land allocated to sugarbeet production in region j when
the adoption rate rj, the price markup mj, the seed cost per hectare dwj, and the
equilibrium price for sugar ps,j.21
To summarize, our strategy for estimating surpluses created by the introduction of
herbicide tolerant sugarbeets and accruing to innovators, domestic and international
farmers and consumers is the following:
1. as a benchmark, we assume hypothetically
11 that the European Union’s sugar
industry, as a competitive player in the world market, embraced the new
technology of herbicide resistant sugarbeets since the marketing year 1996-1997,
and progressively adopted it up to 2000-2001;
2. we allow technology spillovers to the rest of the world (ROW), but assume that
the ROW is lagging
12 behind the EU in the adoption of the new technology;
3. we parameterize the supply functions of the 14 production blocks (equation 1) and
aggregate them up to the EU sugar supply function (equation 2);
4. we parameterize the aggregate ROW supply function (equation 1);
5. we calculate the counterfactual world price as a function of the shifts of aggregate
EU supply, export demand, and aggregate ROW supply (equation 15);
6. to satisfy the auto-financing constraint (equation 5), we transmit the world price
decline on domestic prices via a feedback system (equations 3 to 8);
7. for each country we calculate the change in producers’ surplus using the corrected
(step 6) domestic prices and counterfactual world price (equations 16 to 19);
8. we calculate the aggregate change in the EU producers’ surplus by adding up the
surplus change of each individual production block (equation 20);
9. we calculate the aggregate change in the ROW producers’ surplus (equation 21)
and ROW consumers’ surplus (equation 22);
10. we calculate the rents accruing to input suppliers (equation 23);
11. according to an exogenously assumed adoption curve, the accumulated present
value of the surpluses accrued during the five-year period 1996/1997-2000/2001 is22
calculated as well as the distribution of these surpluses among (1) EU member
countries and (2) stakeholders in the sugar sector, such as input suppliers,
producers and consumers;
12. using stochastic sensitivity analysis via @Risk, subjective prior distributions of
non-deterministic parameters (elasticities, yield increases, cost reductions,
technology markup price, etc.) are included to generate posterior distributions of
the outcomes (counterfactual world price and research benefits) of the model
(Davis and Espinoza).  The model is concluded by an extensive scenario analysis.
EUWABSIM
Our theoretical framework is materialized in the simulation model ‘EUWABSIM’
(European Union Welfare effects of Agricultural Biotechnology Simulation Model).
This software package is made up of three interlaced components: (1) an Excel
module for data management, (2) a Mathcad module, containing the mathematical
body of the model, and (3) an @Risk module, containing the ‘uncertainty element’ of
the model, for carrying out sensitivity and scenario analyses.
Data
The estimate of the cost reduction induced by the introduction of the new technology
is crucial to the economic surplus calculation.  Due to the absence of farm level
adoption in the EU, we combine information from field trials with production cost
data from national farm surveys and Eurostat to calibrate the technology-specific
parameters a and b.  At a first pass, an exogenously assumed adoption curve (r) is
used, combined with a relatively wide distribution of potential markup prices (m) for
herbicide tolerant sugarbeets.  The minimum, most likely and maximum value of the23
markup prices are assessed using expert opinions and analogies with other agricultural
biotechnology innovations.  Supply and demand elasticities and their respective
standard errors are taken from literature.  The work of Poonyth et al. is particularly
interesting since it reports very reliable estimates for each EU member country’s
elasticity of land supply with respect to sugarbeet prices, defined as y = (¶L/¶p)(p/L).
Given these estimates, the parameter q is calibrated as q = yp/py (Moschini, Lapan,
and Sobolevsky).  For prices, quantities and quota, various sources (USDA, European
Commission, etc.) are used.  Given these assumed, estimated and retrieved
parameters, structural parameters, such as l, A, G, and k’ will be calibrated so as to
retrieve acreage, quantity, yield and price data for the period 1996/1997-2000/2001.
Extensions of the Model
A first interesting extension to the model in future work could be the inclusion of
social costs due to environmental externalities.  Detailed information is needed about
the current externalities, occurring in conventional sugarbeet growing, as well as a
methodology to valorize these externalities and translate them into social costs.  These
costs can be included into the welfare framework.  They cause a negative shift of the
supply curve, enabling to partition the benefits and costs between producers and
environment (Alston, Norton, and Pardey).
Secondly, as a first pass we exogenously assumed an adoption curve and a
distribution of possible price markups while in reality these parameters are
endogenous variables of the model.  Adoption will depend on profit, which depends,
in its turn, on the price of the innovation.  Reversely, the markup price depends on
demand (adoption), which depends on profit.  An extension could be to endogenize24
these variables in the model.  However, actual consumer and political resistance
towards GMO’s, especially in the European Union, has shown that the simplified
scheme of adoption we just outlined, does not hold any longer.  Especially in the case
of the sugar sector – despite the fact that labeling will not be necessary – sugar and
sugarbeet demand is very concentrated.  If one of the major clients (e.g. Coca Cola)
refuses sugar produced with GM sugarbeets, processors will change their contracts
towards producers and force them to produce GM-free.  Hence, the adoption decisions
of the latter are no longer autonomous as in the past with previous agricultural
innovations.  Thus, the combination of uncertainty and a strongly concentrated sugar
industry will complicate the endogenization of adoption and biotechnology pricing
policies in the model.
Finally, an extension could be to re-run the model for different scenarios of
liberalization of the EU’s sugar CMO.  These studies would illustrate the distortions
that occur in the interaction between policies and modern agricultural innovations and
that would prevent the benefits from R&D to flow from beet growers to consumers.
Conclusions and Expected Outcomes
We showed that the EU’s sugar market could serve as a relevant case study for the
calculation of the ex-ante welfare effects of agricultural biotechnology in the EU.
Therefore, we developed a theoretical welfare framework shaped to the characteristics
of the EU’s Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar.  The result is the
simulation model ‘EUWABSIM’, which enables, in future work, to assess the size
and distribution of the benefits of transgenic sugarbeet adoption in the European
Union and the Rest of the World.25
Since only two gene developers (Monsanto and Aventis) and three seed companies
(KWS, Advanta and Novartis) dominate the market for GM sugarbeet seeds, seed
prices will be higher compared with a competitive market.  As a result, some benefits
will accrue to (1) input suppliers in the form of ‘oligopolistic rents’.  However, due to
the presence of alternative non-GM technologies, the input sector pricing decisions
are bounded by the producers’ adoption incentive.  Consequently, (2) producers will
be able to extract a part of the benefits, in most cases a within-quota benefit that is
more or less protected from price depreciation.  Low cost countries will gain some
additional benefits on the world market.  However, declining word prices, since the
EU is an important player in international sugar trade, will dampen these producer
surplus increases.  The outcome for producers in the rest of the world will depend on
technology adoption and on structural parameters of the world sugar trade.  If the
ROW is lagging behind the EU, as we hypothetically assume, competition on the
world market between the two players will adversely affect ROW producers and
reversely.  Given that quota prices for both growers and processors are fixed, there is
no rent in this model that accrues to (3) processors.  Due to fixed internal sugar
prices, EU (4) consumers will not see any price change or welfare increase in the
short run.  ROW consumers will gain, due to the depressing effect of the technology
on world prices.  In literature there is widespread belief that positive environmental
externalities of HT sugarbeets (declining herbicide use and toxicity) exceed negative
ones (gene flow risks, weed resistance, etc.).  Hence, net benefits, or more correct a
reduction in current negative externalities (social costs), are expected to flow to the
(5) environment.  Finally, since the CMO for sugar is largely self-financing from a
public financing perspective, neither public expenditures – except for public R&D in
the sugar sector – nor benefits will accrue to (6) governments in the EU.26
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Figure 1: Change in Marshallian Surplus (area ABCF or cGHw1/a a) and
Innovated Input Suppliers’ Surplus (area w1/a aHIc/a a) Resulting from an IPR-
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1 In this paper, we only present the theoretical framework.  The model will be tested and run after data
collection is achieved.  Results will be reported in a future version of this paper.
2 This is actually the only way benefits of technological progress end up being passed on to consumers
in the European Union (Thirtle).
3 despite the fact that currently, an important share of imported animal feed in Europe is genetically
modified
4 We convert all quantities and prices to their white sugar equivalent.  Since we assume constant unit
extraction rates and costs per member country, there is no rent in this model that accrues to processors.
Given that for within-quota production, prices for both growers and processors are fixed, this is a
realistic assumption.
5 The model includes 14 sugar production blocks of 15 countries.  Belgium and Luxembourg are united
in one block.
6 However, intervention is hardly used in the European sugar sector as surpluses are exported to the
world market.  The costs of keeping sugar (storage, financing, etc.) are reimbursed to manufacturers.
7 Producers may carry over a quantity of C sugar to the following marketing year equal to a maximum
of 20 % of their A quota (European Commission).
8 It can be argued that even C sugar is implicitly subsidized since fixed costs of exporting producers are
already covered by the high within-quota prices (Harris and Tangermann).
9 In the short run, producers could stock and carry over surpluses generated by the innovation, but this
‘hold-up’ of R&D benefits can only be temporal, since these stocks are limited to 20 % of the A quota.
10 This is only true to a certain extent, since the auto-financing constraint relates world prices to
domestic prices (equations 3 to 8).  Increases in EU’s C sugar exports, due to technological change,
engender a decline of the world price which is reflected on A and B sugar prices and finally on the
research benefits of within-quota sugar production (see below).
11 As we mentioned earlier, this strategy reveals the benefits foregone or costs of the current
moratorium on GMO’s in the EU, and more specifically on transgenic sugarbeets.
12 In reality, the opposite will probably happen due to the hesitant behaviour of the EU in taking
regulatory decisions.  But again, our framework aims at estimating ‘what could have been’, rather than
‘what will be’.